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HEADQUARTERS 319TH INFANTRY  
Office of the Regimental Commander  
APO #80, U. S. ARMY

1 October 1944

AG 319

SUBJECT: Reports After Action Against Enemy  
TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

From: 1 September 1944  
To : 30 September 1944

SECTION I.....Summary of daily operations and action (S-3)  
SECTION II.....Intelligence operations (S-2)  
SECTION III.....Logistics, supply procedure, problems (S-4)  
SECTION IV.....Personnel and allied administration (S-1)

SECTION I - Summary of daily operations and action (S-3)

A. 1 Sept 44 - ST MIHIEL

319 CT (-) received mission to Adv as ordered and occupy positions Vic JOUY SOUS LES COTES protecting Div right front. 3d Bn Adv on town under shell fire. K Co led Adv into town. 1 Co 2d Bn occupied FT ST MIHIEL, remainder of Bn pushed through town and occupied high ground to SE of ST MIHIEL. 3d Bn (-K Co) occupied high ground to N of town. K Co occupied town. During night small Vels crossed river by ferry constructed by Engrs. Positions consolidated for night. 1st Bn Atchd to CCA 4th Armd at COMBERCY.

B. 2 - 3 Sept 44 - JOUY SOUS LES COTES

319 CT (-) received orders to Adv and occupy positions Vic JOUY SOUS LES COTES protecting Div right front. Marched by foot and Mtr to JOUY SOUS LES COTES, outposted position, 1st Bn on right, 2d Bn on left, 3d Bn (-) in Res. 1st Bn reverted to CT control for CCA 4th Armd.

C. 4 - 15 Sept 44 - TOUL

Received orders to Adv and seize and occupy high ground SE of TOUL. 3d Bn Atk at 140700 Sept 44 and seized high ground. Remainder CT moved into position N of TOUL. On 50800 Sept 44 3d Bn continued Atk but was stopped by enemy fire before reaching high ground GONDREVILLE, VILLEY LE SEC. 3d Bn consolidated position 1 Km W of Obj and held for night. 6 Sept 44 3d Bn again Atkd with mission of seizing FT VILLEY LE SEC and FT GONDREVILLE, concentrated on FT VILLEY LE SEC but were unable to take the fort. 7 Sept 44 1st Bn received mission to sweep BOIS D'LIVERDUN of enemy and contact 318th Inf at junction of MOSELLE and MEURTHE RIVERS. No enemy found in woods and contact made. 8 Sept 44 1st Bn received enemy counter-attack Vic LIVERDUN. F Co 319th Inf committed in support of 1st Bn, Atk repulsed. 1st Bn (Reinf) counter-attacked at 1830 and drove enemy back gaining high ground NW of town, consolidated position for the night. At 091830 A Co 1st Bn (Reinf), 1 squad Tks with supporting fires of 905th FA Bn and Corps Arty attacked LIVERDUN in conjunction with G Co 318th Inf. Entered town at 2100 and consolidated positions. 10 Sept 44 3d Bn FT VILLEY LE SEC and town GONDREVILLE. Continued mopping up action in LIVERDUN and Vic. Took over mission of outposting river front from RR Br E of LIVERDUN Vic POMPEY to FT VILLEY LE SEC Incl, 2d Bn continued to mop up woods N of POMPEY. Felt out

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Summary of daily operations and action (Cont'd).

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enemy strength FORET DE HAYE by patrols Fr 3d Bn. On ~~110600~~ Sept 14 CT 319 part of task force of Brig Gen SEABREE to Adv on high ground W of NANCY and seize NANCY on order. While carrying out mission CT 319 received orders to revert to Div control. Proceeded to assembly area in woods W of BELLEVILLE. 3d Bn 319th Inf ordered to augment 1st Bn 317th Inf E of river Vic BEZAUMONT at once after arrival in assembly area. 2d Bn remained in position holding river line LIVERDUN to BELLEVILLE.

D. ~~16 Sept 44~~ - BOIS DE CHAUDENEY

Ordered to send 2d Bn E of MOSELLE R Vic LOISY. 1st Bn Atchd to 318th Inf. F Co 319th Inf relieved 2 Cos 317th Inf GENEVIEVE, LANDREMONT RIDGE. Remainder of CT remained E of MOSELLE R W of BELLEVILLE.

E. ~~17 - 30 Sept 44~~ - LOISY - ATTON

Received mission to occupy PONT A MOUSSON, ATTON, LESMENILS, MORVILLE SUR SEILLES, PORT SUR SEILLES. 1st Bn occupied and outposted LESMENILS reverting to CT control. 2d Bn occupied and outposted PONT A MOUSSON. 3d Bn given mission of relieving 1st Bn 318th Inf in MORVILLE SUR SEILLE sent Reinf Plat to patrol PORT SUR SEILLES. On ~~18 Sept 44~~ received mission to sieze and occupy line ST JURE - RAUCOURT - NOMENY. Atk with 1st and 3d Bns abreast reached W edge LE SEILLES R, on Div order withdrew to line on E edge BOIS DE LA FOURASSE. 2d Bn maintained present positions. ~~19 Sept 44~~ received orders to sideslip line to the S to cover gap between 319 CT and 318th Inf. 3d Bn tied in with 318th Inf on right. 1st Bn tied in on Pt RJ 1000 Yds SE LESMENILS. E Co 2d Bn protected S flank of Regt. On ~~20 Sept 44~~ 1st and 3d Bn advanced to W bank LE SEILLES R and withdrew to former positions on Div order. ~~21 Sept 44~~ one Bn 318th Inf Atchd to CT 319, 2d Bn 319 CT reverted to Div Res and moved Vic LOISY. 319 CT (-) plus one Bn 318th Inf to hold present position. ~~22 Sept 44~~ 1st Bn 318th Inf relieved of attachment and reverted to Div control. 2d Bn 319 CT reverted to Regt control. 2d Bn (-F Co) outposted GENEVIEVE - LANDREMONT RIDGE. F Co (- 1 Plat) relieved 1st Bn 318th Inf and outposted E edge BOIS DE ST CLEMENT. 1 Plat F Co on PELAISE HILL relieved by 318th Inf and reverted to Co control. CT continued to hold present positions patrolling to LE SEILLES R. On ~~26 Sept 44~~ received Div order to dig in all around defensive position and hold ground now occupied. Rcn towns of PORT SUR SEILLES and MORVILLE SUR SEILLES. Met enemy action at each town. K Co (- 1 Plat) occupied PORT SUR SEILLES ~~26 Sept 44~~. ~~29 Sept 44~~ 2 Plats B Co occupied MORVILLE. 2d Bn moved to assembly area Vic ATTON. E Co 2d Bn relieved C Co 1st Bn at LESMENILS and C Co reverted to Bn Res. 1 Plat G Co relieved 1 Plat C Co on MOUSSON HILL. ~~30 Sept 44~~ continued to hold present position and to improve defense.

Reports After Action Against Enemy (cont'd)

SECTION II...Intelligence Operations (S-2)

1. The Pursuit.

The enemy contact first established during this period was made at ST. MIHIEL where the enemy made a brief attempt at resistance but continued his withdrawal to the E leaving small delaying forces to oppose our advance. It was evident that his plan was to delay as long as possible and select more advantageous terrain for his defense. The enemy had failed to use the high ground E of ST. MIHIEL which held the commanding position overlooking the city. The bridge over the MEUSE RIVER was blown by the enemy as the I & R Platoon was about to seize it. The crossing was made by barge and the pursuit was continued toward the E.

Intelligence Operations During Period.

Enemy information during this period was obtained mostly from the following sources:

- a. Prisoners of War.
- b. I & R Platoon.
- c. Civil Affairs Officer.
- d. Voluntary information from friendly civilians.

Information of the enemy was rather sketchy due to the failure of the enemy to maintain any contact. Much of the information was extremely general and not particularly valuable for our use.

2. The Attack (TOUL Area)

The enemy was located on the high ground E of the Rhin River in the vicinity of TOUL. A PW captured by the FFI gave us information as to the general positions and strength of the enemy. From him it was learned that the enemy was elements of the 3d Parachute Training Regiment, and that the weapons included a high percentage of machine guns and automatic weapons. This information proved highly valuable and extremely accurate and enabled us to complete our mission for the first day of the attack.

The enemy withdrew to higher ground and established lines generally from FORT DE VILLEY LE SEC N along the W edge of the FORET DE HAYE and to W side of river in vicinity of LIVERDUN and POMPEY.

Intelligence Operations.

The Intelligence Operations during this period were extremely varied. Enemy information was obtained from the following sources:

- a. Prisoners of War.
- b. Patrols.
- c. MII.



## SECTION II...Intelligence Operations (Cont'd)

d. FFI Officers coming from various points such as NANCY, TOUL, GONDREVILLE and VILLE LE SEC.

- e. Civilian reports.
- f. Aerial photographs.
- g. Captured documents and maps.
- h. CA Officer interviews.

A very active FFI was well organized and was extremely valuable in its connection with the MII.

The information on the terrain including the FORET DE HAYE was obtained from the following sources:

- a. Supervisor of the FORET.
- b. Large scale French maps. (obtained thru MII)
- c. Civilians who had been recently in the FORET DE HAYE.
- d. Aerial photographs.

It was almost impossible to obtain any information which could be considered reliable on the strength of the enemy located within the FORET DE HAYE. The only source of enemy information was from civilians, as our patrols were unable to penetrate the FORET to any great depth.

### 3. Defense.

This Combat Team went into a defensive position covering a considerable frontage generally along the E edge of the FORET DE FACQ in the vicinity of ATTON.

During this phase the Germans were identified as belonging to the 29th Motorized Regiment, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. The enemy, according to PW reports, had been ordered to hold this area at any cost. The Germans had set up hastily fortified positions on the high ground E of the SIELLE RIVER. The enemy occupied World War I positions which they steadily improved. The position along the E bank of the river enabled the enemy to have close observation of any approach to the river from the W which enabled them to place artillery and mortar fire anywhere to their immediate front.

### Intelligence Operations.

The information about the enemy was rather limited during this phase due to the following reasons:

a. The Germans had ordered that all civilians be kept E of the SIELLE RIVER and information from refugees was entirely limited to those who escaped thru the lines and for the most part had limited knowledge of the enemy.

b. The FFI in this area was almost non-existent.

c. Civilian attitude is not enthusiastic about American occupation and cooperation does not exist as it has in the past. Reports of collaborationists are more frequent than in the past.

SECTION II...Intelligence Operations (Cont'd)

- d. Enemy information was limited to:
- (1) Prisoners of War.
  - (2) Captured documents and maps.
  - (3) Refugees screened by CIC.

It is believed that from this point the sources of enemy information will become more limited as we approach Germany. Numerous reports of civilians actually bearing arms and working with the enemy have not been confirmed.

Report after action against enemy (contd)

SECTION III - Logistics, supply procedure, problems. (S-4)

1. Class I (Rations)

a. Ration request were submitted to Regtl S-4 daily for issuance 48 hours later. Requests were consolidated and forwarded to Div QM on a daily telegram.

b. Requests for rations showed the effective strength of the requesting units and the type of rations desired, namely C, K, or 10 in 1.

c. All units were required to maintain a two (2) day reserve for emergency. In the event that the reserve became depleted, a separate request was submitted to the Regtl S-4 indicating that the rations requested were for the purpose of maintaining the two (2) day reserve.

d. Whenever possible, C, K, or 10 in 1 rations were permitted to be supplemented by any type A or B rations that were available, either issued through QM or through purchases from Unit Funds.

e. All troops were warned that captured enemy foods and beverages would not be consumed except upon release by a medical officer who would check for the possibility of poison having been placed therein.

2. Water.

a. All troops were warned that water secured from other than authorized water points would be chlorinated or boiled before using.

b. Whenever available, water for use by troops was drawn from WPs set up by Army or Div Engineers. Units had sufficient Calcium Hypochlorite to purify water drawn from any sources available in the event that there was not an Army or Div Engineer WP.

3. Class II.

a. All unit requisitions for Class II supplies were cleared through each Bn S-4 to Regtl S-4. Special Unit Companies submitted requisitions individually to Regtl S-4.

b. Requisitions submitted by units to Regtl S-4 were checked to see that the following were correct:

- (1) Correct nomenclature was used.
- (2) Tarrif sizes on clothing requisitions were used.
- (3) SNL groups and stock numbers were shown on all requisitions for ordnance items.
- (4) Only one class of property was shown on each requisition.
- (5) That basis of requisitions from units was shown and requisition did not exceed authorized allowances.

c. Upon receipt of requisitions from units they were consolidated and forwarded to one of the Div Special Staffs by Regtl S-4.

d. When the property was drawn it was broken down to units and issued on a tally-out.

e. In the event that requisitioned organizational equipment was not available and upon notification that it was not available, units were notified to use requisition as a drop-voucher to company property and the equipment was held on back order by Regtl S-4.

f. Units were instructed that requisitions would not be duplicated in any case unless called for by the Regtl S-4.

Report after action against enemy (contd)

SECTION III - Logistics, supply procedure, problems (contd).

3. Class II (contd)

g. Upon receipt of equipment, units had to turn in all salvage that the new equipment replaced. Salvage was segregated into like items, bundled, and turned in to the Regtl Field Train, who in turn consolidated it in to bundles and turned it in to the Class I truckhead.

4. Class III.

a. Gasoline was issued to units on a can for can exchange basis.  
b. Requested Class III from Div QM through daily telegram.  
c. Oils and greases were issued to units from stock on hand at Regtl Field Train.

5. Class IV.

a. Units requiring Class IV supplies had to submit requisitions to Regtl S-4 through Regtl S-3. If requests were approved, it was forwarded to the appropriate Special Staff Officer.

6. Class V.

a. Third Army Scale basic loads of ammunition were maintained by units at all times.  
b. Requests for maintenance quantities were submitted to the Regtl Munitions Officer at the Regtl Field Train when required. Requests contained a certificate signed by an officer that the request did not exceed the basic load.

7. The following instructions regarding the disposition of individual and organizational CWS protective equipment was effective.

a. Items of individual equipment were stored in or near organization service train bivouac.  
b. Items of organizational equipment were retained by units.  
c. Impregnated clothing on hand was retained and used as ordinary clothing until unserviceable.  
d. Upon receipt of CWS equipment from storage, units conducted an inspection to determine completeness and serviceability of T/E allowance on certain items. Requisitions for shortages were submitted without delay to the Regtl S-4. All other CWS equipment on hand was turned in to CWS Class II and IV depots.

8. Evacuation.

a. Deceased: Evacuated as near as possible to an axis of communication and the Graves Registration Officer was notified as to the location of the bodies. The collecting point was usually located in the vicinity of the medical collecting point. From the Regtl Collecting Point, bodies were evacuated by the Division Graves Registration Officer.  
b. Prisoners: Evacuated by units to the Combat Team PWE. After interrogation, they were evacuated to the Division PWE.



Reports after action against enemy (contd)

SECTION III - Logistics, supply procedure, problems (S-4)(contd)

c. Materiel:

(1) Motor vehicles and weapons were evacuated by units to the Field Train if possible. If not possible, the S-4 was advised as to the location, and personnel from the Field Train evacuated the vehicle or weapon. From the Field Train, the item was evacuated to 780th Ord Co.

(2) Salvage was evacuated to Field Train and from there to the appropriate supply service.

d. Captured Materiel: All captured materiel was placed under guard and the Div G-4 was notified as to the location.

9. Mail: Picked up from Div Rr Ech whenever possible by the Regtl Mail Sgt, broken down to units, and issued to authorized mail clerks at the Regtl Field Train.

10. Duffle Bags.

a. Duffle bags were moved from storage in Avranches to Pont a Mousson. All duffle bags were reissued to the men with instructions to pull necessary items of clothing to complete the prescribed uniform. Cotton undershirts, drawers and cotton socks were turned in for salvage.

b. All duffle bags belonging to men killed in action or seriously wounded in action were opened and all government issue clothing and equipment separated from personal effects. GI clothing and equipment was either reissued or turned in to Div G4 as salvage. Personal effects were turned over to Div G4 for disposition.

11. Difficulties encountered in supplies.

a. Insufficient transportation.

(1) It was necessary that the officers listed below had transportation either permanently or on numerous occasions even though no provision is made in the T/E for this transportation. This made it necessary to draw the required transportation from units within the Regt thereby making it difficult if not impossible, to load organizational equipment on the remaining transportation.

(a) Three (3) 1/4 ton trucks required for Regt Ld Officers.

(b) One 1/4 ton truck required for Regtl S-1

(c) One 1-1/2 ton truck and one 1-ton trailer for the Graves Registration Officer.

b. Replacements. Difficulty has been encountered when replacements were assigned to this regiment poorly equipped. In many instances men were short essential items of clothing and equipment to the extent that their combat efficiency was seriously impaired. It is recommended that replacements be fully equipped when they are assigned since in many cases requisitions for this equipment are slow in being filled.



#### SECTION IV - Personnel and allied administration (S-1)

##### 1. Replacements.

a. The prompt replacement of casualties has enabled the organization to remain at Table of Organization strength, and the replacement of specialists, especially communications personnel, has been very satisfactory. However, the training of some replacements, such as riflemen, machine gunners and automatic riflemen, has not been satisfactory.

b. The policy of returning men who have been wounded and evacuated to their parent organization upon their return to duty has worked out exceptionally well and is a great morale factor.

##### 2. Special Service.

Entertainment for men in the front lines has been satisfactory as indicated below:

a. Red Cross Mobile Units have been obtained and brought up to within 2000 yards of the front lines where the men could be served hot coffee and doughnuts, music, and a look at a wholesome, goodlooking American girl. The latter is considered as being the most important part of this service and their praises for these girls are very high. These girls are doing a wonderful job.

b. Movies and Shows. It is felt that movies and shows, such as those that are received in this sector, are not suitable because of the necessity for spending an hour or so at one place. It is, therefore, suggested that small groups of showmen and show-women, such as a jeep load, be provided for the front lines. These small groups could go up to company or even platoon command posts and entertain where it is most needed and deserved. A suggested organization is one (1) master of ceremonies (man or woman) and driver, one woman dancer, one musician (man or woman) and one vocalist, (man or woman). Necessary transportation would be provided for personnel, small organ or accordeon, public address system, a roll-up board for dancer, and other theatrical paraphernalia.

c. Bands and Orchestras. The Division Band has been split up into small orchestral groups which have given programs of popular music near the front lines. This has proven to be a great morale factor and has received the highest praise of the men. This form of entertainment is highly flexible and should be encouraged.

d. Press Relations. The Entertainment Non-Commissioned Officer is used to cover the front line companies for news. He contacts the individual officers and men in their foxholes and has been successful in getting some good stories.

##### 3. Graves Registration.

Evacuation of the dead is on the collecting-point system and has presented no problems.

##### 4. Personnel Administration (Paper Work).

The bulk of the paper work for all companies and battalions is done by the enlisted staff section at the Regimental Command Post. Rough drafts in pencil, giving the necessary tactical details for recommendations for awards, are submitted for rewriting and typing. Administrative questions are turned in each night with the morning reports, are answered and telephoned or sent

SECTION IV - Personnel and allied administration (S-1)(contd).

back through message center. An effort is made to relieve the tactical commander of all paper work, so that he can devote all of his time to the annihilation of Germans.

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Encl:

Journals for the Month of September, 1944.